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Essays 
REDEFINING STATE POWER AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
Jonathan Hafetz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
America’s “war on terrorism” initiated after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks has served more than a rhetorical function.1  It reflects 
the U.S. government’s considered legal position that it is engaged in an 
armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated groups—a 
conflict of unbounded territorial scope and uncertain, if not perpetual, 
duration.  The United States’ adoption of a war paradigm as a central 
part of its counter-terrorism policy has had significant consequences.  
Among the most important has been the expansion of state power at the 
expense of individual liberties. 
This Essay explores the impact of the war on terror on the detention 
and treatment of terrorism suspects.  Part I describes the shift in U.S. 
policy after the 9/11 attacks and the legal underpinnings of the war on 
terrorism.  Part II examines how a war paradigm underlies key aspects of 
the United States’ approach to terrorism, including:  (1) indefinite 
detention; (2) the use of military commissions rather than regular 
criminal courts; and (3) the rendition of terrorism suspects.  Part III 
explores the ways in which the war on terrorism has become 
institutionalized, and the consequences for the state, society, and 
individual rights. 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to 
thank Michael Mulanaphy for his research assistance and the editorial staff of the Valparaiso 
University Law Review. 
1 This Essay will use the phrase “war on terrorism” to describe the United States’ armed 
conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.  Although the Obama 
administration has refrained from using this phrase, it has maintained that the United 
States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups and 
continued many “war on terrorism” policies. 
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II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
Vice President Dick Cheney has said that “9/11 changed 
everything.”2  But it was the decisions made after the 9/11 attacks that 
had the most far-reaching impact on U.S. counter-terrorism policy.  The 
shift in the United States’ approach to terrorism was immediate.  On 
September 18, 2001, President Bush signed into law a joint congressional 
resolution authorizing him “to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the 9/11 
attacks as well as those who “harbored” them.3  Addressing the nation 
two days later, President Bush framed the fight in terms of an 
apocalyptic armed struggle.  “Americans,” he said, “should not expect 
one battle but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen.”4  This 
new war, President Bush suggested, would not be fought against another 
country, or necessarily on battlefields, but instead would be waged 
across the globe against a transnational terrorist organization and its 
affiliates. 
President Bush’s framework sought to galvanize the country and to 
signal that the United States would use all of its power and resources to 
fight terrorism.  It also, however, indicated an important change in U.S. 
policy, away from treating terrorism through a law enforcement model 
and towards the adoption of a military-based approach.  In the following 
months, the precise contours of this new kind of war—the war on 
terror—would be defined through a series of executive-branch 
memoranda and decisions. 
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order calling for 
the establishment of military commissions to try prisoners for war 
crimes.5  The United States had not used military commissions since 
World War II, and its past use of these ad hoc tribunals had been 
criticized for denying defendants due process and implementing a form 
of victor’s justice.6  President Bush’s order nevertheless swept broadly, 
                                                 
2 Meet the Press:  Dick Cheney (NBC television broadcast Sept. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-sept/ 
(transcript). 
3 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
4 Frank Pellegini, The Bush Speech: How to Rally a Nation, TIME U.S. (Sept. 21, 2001), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175757,00.html. 
5 Military Order of November 13, 2001:  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,831–36 (Nov. 16, 2001), 
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 25–28 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
6 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL:  A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND 
AMERICAN LAW (2003); Alan W. Clarke, De-Cloaking Torture: Boumediene and the Military 
Commissions Act, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 59, 86 n.115 (2009) 
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authorizing the commissions to prosecute any foreign national the 
President had “reason to believe . . . was a member of . . . al Qa[e]da” or 
had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit” a terrorist 
act.7 
In addition, the administration began describing prisoners as 
“enemy combatants,” claiming that the government could detain them 
indefinitely without charge instead of prosecuting them.  In war, the 
administration argued, enemy combatant detentions were routine and 
well-accepted.  A substantial number of prisoners detained after 9/11, 
however, bore little, if any, resemblance to any established definition or 
traditional understanding of a “combatant.”  The prisoners included 
individuals who were not members of an enemy government’s armed 
forces, had not been on a battlefield, and had not taken part in hostilities 
against the United States or its allies.  Some prisoners were seized 
outside areas of armed conflict altogether, in places such as Bosnia or 
The Gambia.8 
Intelligence-gathering was a central, if not the primary, goal of the 
detentions.  As Vice President Dick Cheney explained after the 9/11 
attacks, the United States planned to “work . . . the dark side,” doing 
things “quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that 
are available to our intelligence agencies.”9  In a series of memoranda, 
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel sanctioned various 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” that bordered on, and in some 
cases amounted to, torture, including water-boarding, cold cell, and 
prolonged sleep deprivation.10  War helped to supply a justification for 
these techniques, which the Bush administration grounded in the 
President’s power as commander-in-chief under Article II of the 
Constitution—a power that the authors of the Torture Memos claimed 
was without restriction—notwithstanding the Geneva Conventions, the 
                                                 
7 Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 5, § 2(a). 
8 Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants,’ 10 Y.B. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 232 (2007). 
9 Meet the Press:  Dick Cheney (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14720480/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-sept/ 
(transcript). 
10 David Cole, Torture Memos:  The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 8, 
2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-the-
case-against-the-lawyers/; William Ranney Levi, Note, Interrogation’s Law, 118 YALE L.J. 
1434, 1434 (2009).  But see id. at 1439 (arguing that U.S. interrogation policy allowed the 
flexibility to engage in highly coercive interrogation practices long before 9/11). 
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Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, and a federal statute criminalizing torture.11 
These policies were not devised in a vacuum, but were designed to 
facilitate the detention and interrogation of individuals in U.S. custody.  
By January 2002, the United States had already started bringing 
prisoners to its naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; that facility would 
ultimately hold 779 men (171 remain there today).12  In addition, the 
United States detained prisoners at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan 
(where it currently holds approximately 1800 prisoners),13 as well as at 
secret overseas CIA jails, known as “black sites.”14  The United States 
also rendered prisoners to foreign governments for torture.  Together, 
these practices helped create a new U.S.-run global detention system.15 
The war on terror provided the overarching framework for this 
system.  This war, moreover, was defined in such a way to render 
inapplicable international humanitarian law or other legal constraints.  
The Bush administration, for example, maintained that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban members, arguing that 
prisoners in the war on terror were not protected even by Common 
Article 3.16  Article 3 applies in non-international armed conflicts (i.e., 
conflicts not between two nation states) and prohibits torture, cruel 
treatment, and outrages on personal dignity as well as “the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
                                                 
11 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra 
note 5, at 172. 
12 See Andy Worthington, GUANTÁNAMO:  THE DEFINITIVE PRISONER LIST (PART I), 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-part-1/ (last 
updated May 2011). 
13 See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Review Board Decides Fates at Afghan Jail; Rights Groups Say 
Release Hearings at U.S. Facility Don’t Afford Proper Counsel, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at A3 
(placing the number of detainees at 1800). 
14 See, e.g., Associated Press, Secret CIA Prison in Romania Exposed:  Report, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-08/news/30492622_1_cia-
prison-secret-cia-detainees (using this term to describe a recently discovered CIA facility in 
Romania). 
15 See JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11:  CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW 
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011). 
16 Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the 
Attorney General, and Other Officials (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, 
at 134–35. 
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guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”17 
Defining terrorism as a “new kind of war” not only facilitated the 
creation of Guantánamo and other prisons outside the law.18  It also 
paved the way for far-reaching changes in the United States’ approach to 
the detention, trial, and treatment of prisoners in its custody. 
III.  U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
The language and logic of war has played a pivotal role in the 
United States’ confinement of prisoners at Guantánamo and elsewhere.  
Not only did war provide a new nomenclature—the “enemy 
combatant”—to exempt terrorism suspects from the ordinary criminal 
process and trial, but it also supplied the rationale for a new form of 
detention.19  War, by its nature, justifies indefinite confinement.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the detention of enemy 
fighters to prevent their “return to the battlefield is a fundamental [and 
accepted] incident of waging war.”20  In the war on terror, however, 
these detentions are of both unlimited geographic and temporal scope:  
The conflict’s battlefield is global and its duration is long and uncertain.  
Although in Hamdi the Supreme Court cautioned against expanding the 
President’s military detention authority beyond the traditional 
understandings of armed conflict,21 it did not limit that authority, and it 
accepted “enemy combatant” as a valid legal category.  After Hamdi, the 
government continued to apply Hamdi’s logic to authorize detention 
beyond the battlefield in Afghanistan, and lower courts largely 
                                                 
17 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138. 
18 See generally Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/opinion/27RUMS.html (using the phrase “new 
kind of war” to describe the operation against terrorist networks). 
19 Under the Obama administration, the term “unprivileged enemy belligerent” was 
substituted for “enemy combatant.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010, § 948a(7), Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575.  The change, however, was mainly 
cosmetic and did not significantly affect the underlying scope or nature of the military 
detention power asserted.  See Respondents’ Mem. Regarding the Scope of the Govt’s 
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay 
Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442, filed Mar. 13, 2009 (D.D.C.) (TFH) (“Gov’ts Detention 
Authority Br.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-
auth.pdf (discussing the government’s detention power under the 2001 Authorization for 
Use of Military Force). 
20 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
21 Id. at 521 (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of 
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, [the] understanding [that the 
AUMF authorizes detention for the duration of hostilities] may unravel.”). 
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acquiesced in the government’s expansive claims of detention 
authority.22  Over time, the notion of a global armed conflict against al 
Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations took root, gaining 
acceptance among judges, lawmakers, and the public. 
War has also provided a basis for limiting court review of detention 
operations.  The United States has staunchly resisted federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction over war-on-terrorism-detentions, citing the risks and 
difficulties posed by judicial review of military operations and 
interference with intelligence-gathering.  While the Supreme Court 
ultimately upheld federal habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of 
Guantánamo detainees,23 it established a multi-factor test for 
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause that requires courts to consider the burdens on the government 
before finding an entitlement to habeas corpus.24  Following Boumediene, 
the D.C. Circuit rejected extending federal habeas jurisdiction to the 
United States’ detentions at Bagram to avoid interfering with military 
operations there.25  Further, even regarding Guantánamo, the D.C. 
Circuit has narrowly construed the detainees’ habeas rights—out of 
concern with interfering with military and counter-terrorism operations.  
In reviewing detainee habeas cases, the circuit has:  (1) affirmed the 
continuing need for broad executive detention power in the armed 
conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces;26 (2) analyzed 
the government’s allegations with deference and under lax evidentiary 
rules to accommodate the demands of the military and intelligence 
agencies;27 and (3) precluded judges from granting effective relief to 
prisoners whose detentions are found by courts to be invalid.28 
The D.C. Circuit’s recent ruling in Latif v. Obama illustrates this 
approach.29  In Latif, the appellate panel ruled that district judges must 
presume the accuracy of government intelligence reports unless rebutted 
by the petitioner.  While the presumption purportedly applies only to the 
accuracy of what a report describes (e.g., that the detainee, in fact, made 
the particular statement to the interrogator), and not to the underlying 
                                                 
22 See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account:  Habeas Corpus after 
Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit 
after Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit 
narrowly applied Boumediene). 
23 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008). 
24 Id. at 766. 
25 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
26 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
27 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
28 Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1050–51 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
29 Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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truth of the information itself, that distinction makes little difference in 
practice.  Under Latif, judges are unable to critically examine intelligence 
reports prepared by the government amid the fog of war, despite the fact 
that they often consist of multiple levels of hearsay and despite past 
findings by district judges of their unreliability.  And a single such 
report—without any corroborating evidence—is sufficient to justify a 
prisoner’s continued detention.  As Circuit Judge David Tatel noted in 
dissent, the ruling “comes perilously close to suggesting that whatever 
the government says must be treated as true.”30  With this ruling, he 
explained, “it is hard to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s command 
in Boumediene that habeas review be ‘meaningful.’”31 
The war paradigm has also made possible the development of a 
system of military commissions as an alternative forum to federal courts 
for trying terrorism suspects.  Military commissions rest on the premise 
that members or supporters of al Qaeda and associated groups are 
subject to prosecution for a range of offenses under the laws of war by 
virtue of their membership in, or support of, terrorist organizations.  
Congress has twice legislated various offenses triable by military 
commissions.32  Some of these offenses, such as murder in violation of 
the law of war,33 rest solely on the defendant’s status as an “unlawful 
enemy combatant” (or “unprivileged enemy belligerent” under current 
terminology).34  This offense is based on the theory that any harm caused 
by unprivileged belligerents violates the laws and customs of war.35  This 
theory, however, lacks support under international law, and exposes any 
person who fights against the United States or its coalition partners in 
the war on terror to prosecution as a war criminal, even if that person’s 
actions—for example, shooting back at U.S. or allied military forces—
would be lawful if committed by a privileged belligerent (i.e., one who 
qualifies for prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions).36  
                                                 
30 Id. at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31 Id. 
32 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1020, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 
2190; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
33 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(15) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-89 (excluding P.L. 112-55, 112-
74, 112-78, and 112-81)). 
34 See David W. Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the Military 
Charges Against Omar Khadr 9–11 (Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-37, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=1669946 (explaining 
why murder in violation of the law of war, as it has been applied in military commission 
prosecutions, is not a violation of the law of armed conflict). 
35 See id.; Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable:  Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant 
Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 289 (2011). 
36 Corn, supra note 35, at 290–91.  Unlike privileged belligerents in international armed 
conflicts (i.e., conflicts between nation states), “nothing a non-state belligerent can do can 
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Other offenses, such as conspiracy to commit war crimes,37 and material 
support for terrorism,38 are generally not recognized as war crimes under 
international law.39  The application of prosecution for these offenses to 
Guantánamo detainees raises problems not only under international law, 
but also under the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause (since they were 
not law-of-war violations when committed, and were made so only after 
the fact by congressional legislation).  Additionally, the prosecution of 
military commission defendants for providing material support for 
terrorism creates significant jurisdictional overlap with Article III courts, 
as that charge is commonly leveled by prosecutors against defendants in 
federal criminal cases.40 
Framing terrorism as war has not only helped expand the 
substantive scope of criminal liability through military commission 
jurisdiction, but has also led to a diminishment of safeguards against 
wrongful imprisonment.  As in the habeas corpus detention cases, the 
government has argued that the exigencies and challenges presented by 
the war on terrorism warrant laxer evidentiary rules and procedural 
protections than those required in regularly established courts, whether 
under the federal criminal or military justice systems.  In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,41 the Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that 
those exigencies justified deviating from the rules of military courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), including 
by allowing the accused’s exclusion from proceedings and denying the 
accused access to evidence in certain circumstances.42  Yet, while 
                                                                                                             
ever result in ‘lawful’ belligerent status, [thus] impos[ing] an international legal sanction 
without a complimentary international legal reward.”  Id. at 291. 
37 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(29). 
38 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(25). 
39 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597–98 (2006) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.) 
(concluding that conspiracy is not a war crime under the law of war); David Weissbrodt & 
Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials?  The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of Common 
Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 362 n.48 (2008) (noting that 
“providing material support for terrorism” is not considered a war crime under 
international law). 
40 RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING 
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 31–38 (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-
justice.pdf (discussing prosecutors’ use of the material support for terrorism statute in 
federal criminal prosecutions); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FACT SHEET:  TRYING TERROR 
SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL COURTS (2011), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf (same). 
41 548 U.S. at 620–23. 
42 Id. at 622–25 (finding that the military commissions violate article 36(b) of the UCMJ, 
which requires “‘uniform[ity] insofar as practicable’” between courts-martial and military 
commission rules (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000))); see also David J. R. Frakt, Direct 
Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime:  America’s Failed Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 
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subsequent legislation has repaired some of their deficiencies, military 
commissions still give the government greater latitude to rely on 
hearsay, and contain fewer protections against the use of coerced 
evidence, than regularly established courts.43  War, in short, has been 
invoked to justify the development of a separate adjudicatory system 
that lacks the same safeguards as federal criminal courts or military 
courts-martial. 
In addition, war-based rationales underlay the Bush administration’s 
extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects, who were transferred to 
foreign governments or secret CIA-run prisons for torture or other 
highly coercive methods of interrogation.  Before 9/11, the United States 
typically conducted renditions within a law enforcement framework, 
bringing terrorism suspects to the United States to face trial or sending 
them to foreign governments for legal process there.44  Following 9/11, 
however, the United States broke with this rendition to justice model.  
Internal bureaucratic constraints were lifted, and terrorism suspects were 
transferred across the globe—outside any legal framework and with the 
specific purpose of subjecting them to torture or other mistreatment.45  
The legal construct of an armed conflict against terrorist groups helped 
pave the way for this shift, with its emphasis on unfettered executive 
power and its characterization of renditions as mere “wartime transfers” 
exempt from any constraints imposed by international human rights and 
international humanitarian law.46 
IV.  INTER-BRANCH ACCEPTANCE OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
The war on terror has triggered far-reaching changes that transcend 
any one administration.  While the military detention of terrorism 
suspects is subject to greater legal constraints now than after 9/11, those 
                                                                                                             
VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (2012) (describing the Bush administration’s military tribunals 
that were invalidated in Hamdan). 
43 David W. Glazier, Still a Bad Idea:  Military Commissions Under the Obama Administration 
(Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-32, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1658590; see Joanne Mariner, A First Look at the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 
Part Two, FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20091130. 
html. 
44 HAFETZ, supra note 15, at 52–53. 
45 Although the United States had begun rendering terrorism suspects to foreign 
governments during the mid-1990s, after 9/11, the practice expanded significantly, 
operated with fewer internal checks, and was no longer tied to the existence of legal 
proceedings against the suspect in the receiving country.  Id. 
46 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:  Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1394–1418 (2006) (examining the legal justifications for 
extraordinary rendition). 
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detentions have also become institutionalized. The result has been to 
significantly expand state power, limit individual rights, and erode 
accountability mechanisms.  This process of institutionalization is 
reflected in the actions of all three branches of the federal government. 
Following his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama 
ordered the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility within one 
year, and criticized the prior administration for abandoning human 
rights and constitutional values in the struggle against terrorism.  
President Obama’s subsequent failure to close Guantánamo 
demonstrates the continued support for the new status quo among 
Congress, the practical obstacles to restoring legal safeguards after years 
of extrajudicial detention, and the extent to which national security 
policy itself has become highly politicized.  It also suggests how deeply 
the assumptions behind the war on terrorism have become embedded in 
public policy and discourse. 
Even as he promised to close Guantánamo, eliminate any remaining 
secret CIA prisons, and ban torture, President Obama himself endorsed 
central policies underlying the war on terrorism.  While President 
Obama expressed a preference for trying Guantánamo detainees in 
federal court, he said that criminal trials were not always feasible, nor 
were they required.47  President Obama instead accepted that there 
existed a category of individuals too difficult to try, but too dangerous to 
release, who could be detained indefinitely under the 2001 Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),48 as informed by the law of war.49  
President Obama also endorsed the use of military commissions to try 
terrorism suspects, after initially suspending all commission proceedings 
for four months.50  Although President Obama acknowledged that the 
United States’ prior use of commissions at Guantánamo was flawed, he 
believed that military commissions could provide a legitimate alternative 
to the federal criminal courts for the prosecution of certain terrorism 
suspects.51  The administration thus supported legislation aimed at 
reforming commissions and making them a more viable forum for 
                                                 
47 The White House, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009) 
(National Archives, Washington, D.C.). 
48 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
49 Id. 
50 William Glaberson, Vowing More Rights for Accused, Obama Retains Tribunal System, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A1. 
51 Id. 
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terrorism cases.52  With military detention and prosecution, the 
administration has, in short, pursued a policy of tool-maximization and 
legitimization:  maintaining the government’s flexibility to treat 
terrorism suspects under either a law enforcement or law-of-war 
paradigm, while making incremental reforms to make the military 
option more credible and sustainable. 
Congress, in turn, has sought not only to entrench key war on 
terrorism policies, but also to expand them in new ways.  It has sought 
repeatedly to prevent the closure of Guantánamo.  Congress, for 
example, has prohibited the transfer of Guantánamo detainees to the 
United States for any purpose—whether for release, continued detention, 
or criminal prosecution in an Article III court.53  It has also placed 
significant restrictions on the President’s ability to transfer Guantánamo 
detainees to another country, including to their country of origin.54  It 
enacted measures, for example, barring the transfer of any Guantánamo 
detainee to a country where there has been a confirmed case of 
recidivism by a former Guantánamo detainee who was transferred to 
that country55 and requiring a foreign country to provide numerous 
guarantees about a transferred detainee’s future conduct.56  Together, 
these restrictions helped prevent Guantánamo’s closure. 
Recent legislation has not only further embedded war on terrorism 
detention practices, but expanded them in new ways.  The 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act (“2012 NDAA”) expressly authorizes the 
military detention of individuals who were “part of” or who 
“substantially supported” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.57  
Although this provision of the 2012 NDAA largely codifies lower-court 
                                                 
52 The Obama administration helped to secure passage of the Military Commissions Act 
of 2009, which created additional protections for defendants facing prosecution.  See 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat 2190. 
53 See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137. 
54 Id. § 1033(c) (prohibiting the transfer of a detainee to his home country or any third 
country where any detainee previously transferred to that country engaged in terrorist 
activity following his transfer). 
55 Id. § 1033(c)(1). 
56 Id. § 1033(b) (requiring a foreign country to agree to ensure that a transferred prisoner 
will not take action to threaten the United States or its citizens or allies and to share 
information about the transferred prisoner with the United States regarding the prisoner or 
his associates that could affect the security of the United States or its allies). 
57 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. 
§ 1021 (2011).  The provision mirrors the detention authority claimed by the Obama 
administration.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, § 948a(7) Pub. 
L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575.  
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interpretation of the President’s detention authority under the AUMF,58 
the legislation contains several new measures, including one mandating 
that certain terrorism suspects be subjected to military detention.59  
While the President may waive this requirement if he deems it in the 
national security interests of the United States,60 the legislation creates 
for the first time a default presumption of military custody in counter-
terrorism operations.  
Courts have largely accommodated the military treatment of 
terrorism suspects.  They have, for example, accepted the analogy 
between members of al Qaeda (and associated terrorist groups) and 
traditional combatants, who may be detained until the end of the war to 
prevent their return to the battlefield.  Courts have also accepted the use 
of military commissions to try terrorism suspects of war crimes.  
Although the Supreme Court invalidated the military commissions 
created by President Bush’s November 2001 executive order, it did so on 
the basis of those commissions’ failure to adhere to congressional 
requirements,61 and invited subsequent legislative action in the field.62   
Nor has the Supreme Court elsewhere rejected the government’s 
attempt to treat terrorism suspects under a war paradigm. To be sure, in 
Rasul and Boumediene, the Court rebuffed the government’s assertion of 
unreviewable executive detention overseas and held that Guantánamo 
detainees could invoke the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction to 
challenge the lawfulness of their confinement.63  And, in Hamdan, the 
Court ruled that all individuals held in connection with the war on 
terror, including suspected members of al Qaeda, were entitled, at 
minimum, to the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.64  But none of these decisions challenged the underlying 
premise that terrorism suspects could be subjected to military 
jurisdiction and detained or tried outside of the federal criminal justice 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
59 See H.R. 1540 (mandating military detention of individuals who are part of al Qaeda 
or associated forces and who “have participated in the course of planning or carrying out 
an attack or attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners”).  The 
mandatory military detention provision excludes U.S. citizens.  See id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–613 (2006) (describing the commissions’ 
failures to adhere to congressional requirements). 
62 Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”). 
63 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (holding that Guantánamo detainees 
may seek habeas corpus review under the Constitution’s Suspension Clause); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo detainees may seek habeas 
corpus review under the federal habeas corpus statute). 
64 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. 
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system.  Furthermore, by providing some constraints on the executive’s 
more extreme assertions of power—whether by:  (1) insisting on 
legislative authorization for military commissions (Hamdan); (2) 
providing for habeas corpus review of indefinite law-of-war detention 
(Rasul and Boumediene); or (3) affirming the application of baseline 
international legal protections against torture and other mistreatment 
(Hamdan)—these decisions have paradoxically helped to sustain war on 
terrorism detention practices through a process of moderation and 
legitimization. 
America’s response to new terrorist threats shows how much public 
perception and political debate have shifted since 9/11.  After Nigerian 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to detonate an explosive bomb 
hidden in his underwear while aboard a Northwest Airlines flight bound 
for Detroit, he was arrested and charged with attempted murder and use 
of a weapon of mass destruction.  Politicians and pundits immediately 
attacked the Obama administration for prosecuting Abdulmutallab in 
federal court rather than in a military commission, even though federal 
prosecutors had obtained several hundred convictions in terrorism-
related cases since 9/11, and military commissions had yielded only a 
handful, all plagued by controversy.65  Opponents of using Article III 
courts to try terrorism suspects argued, for example, that a federal 
prosecution would undermine the government’s ability to gain useful 
intelligence by preventing the use of harsh interrogation methods and 
mandating procedural protections, including that the defendant be 
afforded a lawyer. 
Nearly a decade of viewing terrorism through the lens of war, rather 
than from a law enforcement perspective, has helped to make it possible 
to argue that terrorist suspects need not be charged in the regular courts 
or afforded the protections given other criminal suspects.  It has also 
contributed to a climate of fear, in which only tough-sounding solutions 
have credibility in the public sphere, and where it is assumed that 
individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution must be sacrificed 
to protect security.  This framing helps explain why, for example, the 
federal indictment of Somali terrorism suspect Ahmed Abdulkadir 
Warsame—after Warsame’s two-month detention on a U.S. ship in the 
Gulf of Aden—prompted attacks against the Obama administration for 
failing to prosecute Warsame in a military commission.66  Bringing 
Warsame to trial in the United States, rather than sending him to 
                                                 
65 Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Senators Patrick J. Leahy (D-
VT) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) (Mar. 26, 2010). 
66 See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A1. 
Hafetz: Redefining State Power and Individual Rights in the War on Terror
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
856 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
Guantánamo, wrote Senators Joseph I. Lieberman and Kelly Ayotte, 
limited the government’s ability to obtain intelligence, risked the 
disclosure of classified and other sensitive information, and endangered 
the country’s safety.67 
The United States’ adoption of a war paradigm, moreover, has 
facilitated the expansion of other controversial practices, such as targeted 
killing, which involves the use of unmanned Predator drones to conduct 
deadly attacks against suspected terrorists.  Outside of armed conflict, a 
state’s authority to use deadly force is limited; domestic and human 
rights law require a concrete, specific, and imminent threat of death or 
serious physical injury to do so.68  The United States, however, has 
utilized the expansive and malleable parameters of the war on terror to 
justify the targeted killing of alleged members of al Qaeda and al Qaeda 
offshoots in places like Yemen and Somalia, where the existence of 
armed conflict and the application of the law of war is uncertain.69  At 
the same time, because targeted killing is justified as a wartime measure, 
it is more difficult to challenge in the courts given the hesitancy of judges 
to interfere with military matters and their historic deference to the 
executive in this realm.70 
V.  CONCLUSION 
After the United States announced that it had killed Osama bin 
Laden, public officials and commentators were careful to emphasize that 
the threat of terrorism remained.  In part, this reflected a pragmatic 
assessment that al Qaeda transcends any one individual, and that the 
danger posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups remains significant.  
But it also highlighted the contradictions and tensions underlying the 
war on terrorism itself.  If the war is not over now, will it ever end and, if 
so, what will be the metric for answering this question?  The withdrawal 
                                                 
67 Joseph I. Lieberman & Kelly Ayotte, Op-ed, Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH. 
POST, July 22, 2011, at A17. 
68 UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON 
EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, PHILIP ALSTON 9–12 (2010), available 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add 
6.pdf; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones:  A Case Study of Pakistan, 
2004–2009, at 11–25 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010) 
(examining the legality of the use of military force against suspected terrorists). 
69 See Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders 51 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-64, 2011) (noting the use of 
targeted killing in Yemen and Somalia). 
70 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing on standing and 
political question grounds the placement of an American citizen located in Yemen on a 
targeted kill list). 
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of U.S. troops from Afghanistan?  A determination by the President that 
the terrorist threat has been eliminated?71 
As if to pre-empt these questions, lawmakers introduced legislation 
reaffirming that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, expressly authorizing the 
indefinite detention of individuals who were part of or substantially 
supported enemy forces in that conflict, and omitting any nexus to the 
9/11 attacks.72  The legislation not only underscores the United States’ 
commitment to a law-of-war-based approach to the detention and trial of 
terrorism suspects, but it also shows the malleability and durability of 
this framing mechanism. 
Bin Laden’s death should have prompted a re-examination of the 
war paradigm.  But, instead, it reinforced how deeply—and perhaps 
irrevocably—that paradigm has permeated national security institutions, 
influenced counter-terrorism policy, and altered public opinion.  Put 
another way, the last decade’s expansion of government power and 
limitations on civil liberties seems less a temporary accommodation of 
the exigencies and demands of war than a permanent transformation in 
the relationship among the state, society, and the individual. 
                                                 
71 See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Op-Ed, This War Is Not Over Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2012, at A31 (describing the difficulties in determining when a war ends). 
72 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. 
§ 1021 (2011); see also Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331, 2012 WL 1721124, at *26–28 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (comparing the 2012 NDAA to the 2001 AUMF). 
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